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Abstract Police reform plays a key role in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s internation-
ally-supervised statebuilding process. It is one of the four key conditions to move the
country closer to its European future. Against this background the article analyses
the role that the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) plays in preparing Bosnian
police agencies for this challenge. Using as guiding tools some of the key elements
of the Mission’s leitmotif—local ownership, European police standards—the article
comes to the conclusion that EUPM has introduced much needed reforms but these
have been overshadowed, among other things, by the police restructuring process
and its unnecessary politicisation of “European police standards/practices” to fit a
model of statehood not shared by all local stakeholders.
Introduction
Police reform continues to play a key role in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
internationally-supervised statebuilding process.1 It is one of the four key conditions
to move the country closer to its European future.2 The inability of the local political
authorities to agree on a police restructuring plan that could satisfy the international
community’s expectations resulted in the country missing the September 2007
deadline to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. Moreover,
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1Hereinafter ‘Bosnia’ or ‘BiH’.
2The other three are public broadcast service reform, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and public administration reform. Bosnia did in fact sign a Stabilisation
and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU on 16 June 2008, thanks mainly to progress in the police
restructuring process that will be discussed later in the article. The SAA is a contractual arrangement that
provides the EU with the formal mechanisms and agreed benchmarks it needs to work with each South
Eastern European country in order to bring them closer to EU standards.
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the number of procedural changes were imposed in the Bosnian Council of Ministers
by the current High Representative3 Miroslav Lajčák and, as a result of this latter
move, the Bosnian Prime Minister Nikola Špirić resigned. In his own words, “twelve
years after Dayton, foreigners have exclusive rule over this country, and I believe
this isn’t good for this country or its citizens” [2]. The Bosnian Serbs also threatened
to withdraw all their representatives from joint institutions. This combination of
events, coinciding with other serious regional tensions, led a number of experts to
describe the whole situation as “the most serious political crisis since the Dayton
agreement brought the Bosnian war to an end in November 1995” [3] or as
“Bosnia’s very survival could be determined in the next few months if not the next
few weeks” [12]. This escalation of tensions came to an end on 4 December 2007
when a pre-accession agreement was reached between the EU and Bosnia on the
basis of Bosnian Serb leaders’ acceptance—by and large—of the parliamentary
procedural changes demanded by Lajčák and the adoption of an Action Plan for
Police Reform by the Council of Ministers. Leaving aside the debate on whether
there has actually been a political crisis in Bosnia—something that the Office of the
High Representative (OHR) would challenge—this new episode in the post-conflict
stabilisation of Bosnia sheds light on the ongoing fragility of reforms in what
remains a very sensitive area of the country’s long-term peaceful stabilisation and
development.4
This article will evaluate the role that the EU has played within the wider
internationally-supervised statebuilding process since it took over from the UN the
responsibility for police matters in Bosnia. Focusing primarily on the activities of the
EU Police Mission (EUPM) from 2003 onwards, it will be argued that this police
mission has tried hard to identify pressing problems and introduce much needed
technical reforms.5 However, these achievements have been overshadowed by a
number of internal and external challenges. Leaving aside the complications arising
from recruitment/resource problems, lack of a clear orientation, suboptimal
coordination with other EU actors—particularly during the first mandate—this
article will instead highlight the challenges arising from the politicisation of what are
loosely defined as “European police standards or practices”.6
In order to develop this argument, the article provides first a brief background to
police reform in Bosnia under the UN and to the importance of certain key elements
(local ownership, European police standards) to how the EUPM mandates were
implemented since 2003. This is then followed, in a third section, by an analysis of
the politically-sensitive nature of the so-called ‘European police standards or
practices’, using the example of the police restructuring process began in 2004.
3 The position of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, now also the European Union's
Special Representative, was created in 1995 immediately after the Dayton Peace Agreement to oversee the
implementation of this agreement.
4 Judy Batt goes further by arguing that this political crisis exposes the failure, rather than the fragility, of
the internationally-supervised statebuilding process (2007, quoted in [3]).
5 The analysis will mainly include elements of the first two EUPM mandates (2003-2005, 2006-2007).
The Mission is currently under its third mandate, due to expire in December 2009.
6 For more information on the other obstacles mentioned see [4, 5].
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The origins of police reform in Bosnia
The General Framework Agreement for Peace for Bosnia and Herzegovina, also
known as the Dayton Peace Agreement/Accords (DPA), was initialled in Dayton on
21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. It brought to an end
the 1992–1995 war but also provided a framework for the political and economic
reconstruction, and social and psychological rehabilitation, of the country through a
complete regeneration of the core functions of society and the state. One of the areas
needing immediate attention was local capacity for law enforcement.
In the former Yugoslavia the police ensured political conformity, stability and
order for Tito’s multinational but single party regime. During the 1990’s war, the
Bosnian nationalist parties, based in their Serb, Croat and Muslim constituencies,
used the police for the same purposes in the territories under their control. But, in a
context of externally-imposed sanctions and embargoes that were designed to reduce
conflicts and atrocities between the communities, the police’s role expanded to
include participation in smuggling, gun running, black marketeering and other
criminal activities under the control of warlords. Police units, often under the com-
mand of military units, also carried out or otherwise participated in the commission
of war crimes in the name of ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, in the immediate phases
after the end of the conflict the police forces continued to be one of the major
sources of physical insecurity for citizens. They consented to, even participated, in
many of the violent incidents that were reported by human rights groups and
international monitors, as clearly illustrated during the 1996 incidents surrounding
the transfer of power to the Bosniak-Croat Federation authorities of some of the
Serb-held suburbs in Sarajevo.
In accordance with Annex 11 of the DPA, the UN established the International
Police Task Force (IPTF), and soon after (under UN Resolution 1035) the UN
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) with the mandate to, among other
things, contribute to the establishment of the rule of law. IPTF was originally limited
to training, monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement personnel, as well
as advising law enforcement agencies on operational matters and the government
authorities on optimal organisational models for these agencies. However, given the
task at hand, these responsibilities were soon complemented with a restructuring/
institution-building mandate and investigative powers that were fully operational in
the 2000–2002 period. Under this wider mandate, the aim became to restructure the
post-Communist and post-paramilitary police forces; reforming the police through
training, selection, certification and de-certification procedures; and democratising
the police forces by establishing a de-politicised, impartial, accountable, multi-ethnic
police service that represented the society it served and abided by the rules of
community policing [14].
By the time UNMIBH/IPTF left Bosnia (December 2002) a “framework of
democratic policing”—to use Javier Solana’s wording [22]—was supposedly in
place. Among the UN successes one finds the downsizing of police numbers from
44,000 to just under 15,800; the removal of many officers accused of war crimes or
having criminal records; the introduction of basic training programmes on
democratic policing-related subjects; the elimination of nationalist insignia from
police forces; and the initiation of important legislative and institutional reforms
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aimed at developing state-level police structures, breaking the link between police
and politics and improving cooperation between the various police agencies that
resulted from the territorial map agreed at Dayton.7 Notwithstanding these positive
achievements, much remained to be done to operationalise that framework of
democratic policing.
EUPM: developing BiH ownership
EUPM arrived in Bosnia having “won” a contest with the OSCE—in fact, an almost
existential competition for what was at the time the recently born EU security and
defence policy8—over the question of what international agency should take over
from the UN the important task of finalising the police reform process in Bosnia.
However the success of the EU in this institutional struggle soon turned into another
kind of struggle, as the EUPM sought to differentiate itself from what had been in
place before 2003—the “we are not the UN” syndrome to use Dominique Orsini’s
terminology [20].9
EUPM’s first and subsequent mandates sought to establish “sustainable policing
arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and
international practice, and thereby raising current BiH police standards” [6]. This
broad statement was translated, in the 2003–2005 period, into four main mission
objectives:
1) development of police independence and accountability;
2) the fight against organised crime and corruption;
3) financially viability and sustainability of the local police; and
4) institution- and capacity-building.10
In other words, EUPM’s trademark was from the very beginning greater local
ownership, something that has acquired with time more importance as Bosnia’s
accession to the EU cannot be based on top-down, imposed reforms.11 This is
something the UN had only done tentatively, often tending towards more assertive
7 The Dayton Peace Accords resulted in a system made up of 13 police agencies that during, the UN and
EU periods, increased to 15 with the creation of two state-level police structures. These are: (1) at the state
level, the State Border Service and the State Investigation and Protection Agency; (2) at the Entity level,
the Federation Police and the Republika Srpska police; (3) the Brčko District Police; and (4) within the
Federation, the ten Cantonal police agencies. Unlike the Federation, Republika Srpska has a centralised
system composed of Public Security Centres but with decision-making powers concentrated in Banja Luka.
8 Confidential interview, Sarajevo, 2002.
9 At the same time, despite this determination to start anew, much of what was developed at the
operational level was influenced by the modus operandi established by UNMIBH/IPTF. For more details
see [4].
10 The second and third mandates have built on this original mandate while changing their scope to
address the operational problems faced during the 2003-2005 period. For more details see EUPM’s
website, www.eupm.org
11 Local ownership is understood here to mean local participation in the reform process but also local
capacity to govern policing matters.
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and dominant approaches, in part due to the difficult context it was operating in.12
Analysts such as Wisler would argue that the Mission’s determination to consolidate
the development of these principles is the product of self-interest, the ultimate goal
being to prepare an “exit strategy” for the international community [24]. Regardless
of whether this is true, such an objective is nevertheless an important step forward in
Bosnia’s post-conflict stabilisation and integration in the EU family. The belief in
local ownership explains EUPM’s reluctance to resort to the Office of the High
Representative/EU Special Representative (OHR/EUSR) to remove or discipline
recalcitrant police officers. This may have slowed down the progress of reform—as
some critics would argue—but it aimed to let the locals move on from the more
intrusive methods used by the UN mission.13
Local ownership was translated, on the one hand, into the need to develop a
functional hierarchy of local decision-making structures or mechanisms, reaching
out from the political level down to local police units. This commitment explains the
efforts EUPM put into incorporating Bosnian police officials into the (operational)
planning process (the so-called “Bosnian Police Steering Board”) as well as in the
execution of key police operations and membership of “project implementation
boards”. The latter initiative brought together EUPM co-locators and local police
officers in an effort to make them jointly responsible for the delivery of police
services [7]. In fact, some projects that were initially developed by EUPM were
gradually put under local responsibility or have been used to encourage local
counterparts to develop similar initiatives. A very illustrative example is the
development of a national strategy on community policing. This concept was first
introduced by the UN and then continued by EUPM in the form of specific
programmes and/or projects in addition to both in-class and in-service training. In
2006 a group of Bosnian police experts, under the auspices of the UK Department
for International Development (DFID), drafted a National Strategy on Community-
Based Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that upon endorsement by the Police
Steering Board in 2007, was sent for final approval to Bosnia’s Council of Ministers
[11].14 By the same token, one could also look into the motivations behind the re-
formulation of EUPM’s Programme Development and Coordination Department
during its second mandate. The role of this Department became to oversee (with the
help of EUPM co-locators) the completion of those programmes that were not
12 Confidential interview, Sarajevo, 2006.
13 Unlike the UN mission, EUPM does not enjoy the power to order dismissals of police officers. It can
refer names for dismissal to the OHR/EUSR. One of the few examples of EUPM’s use of this prerogative
took place during its second mandate. It recommended, together with the EU military force in Bosnia
(EUFOR), the suspension of the Deputy Head of Administration for Police Education of the Ministry of
the Interior of the Republika Srpska (RS), Dragomir Andan. The OHR decision, taken in July 2007, also
applied to 35 of Andan’s officers, all suspected of involvement in war crimes or of helping war criminals
evade justice as concluded by the Bosnian Serb government Commission on Srebrenica.
14 EUPM and the Swiss Development Cooperation Agency also sat in the meetings of the framework
working group. Needless to say, this framework strategy is a step forward but much remains to be done
before community policy takes roots in Bosnia. This strategy is not as comprehensive as originally
expected and, moreover, some police experts remain sceptical about the value of what was achieved
during the UN and/or EUPM period: “sporadic” and “unsystematic”, a scratch in the police surface
(Confidential interviews, Sarajevo, 2006).
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finished by the end of the first mandate in 2005, with the actual development and
implementation of projects under the responsibility of Bosnian police agencies on the
basis of a Memorandum of Understanding signed by both parties in February 2006.15
For local ownership to take root in Bosnia there was also a great need to develop
the managerial skills of the police to lead and coordinate. This was part of a more
general capacity-building policy of support processes within Bosnian police agencies
(budgeting, policy planning, etc.). This explains, in part, EUPM’s exclusive co-
location at mid and senior levels of Bosnian police agencies and Ministries at the
State, Entity, Canton/Public Security Centre (PSC) and Brčko District levels.16 The
aim was to supervise and monitor Bosnian police management cadres when issuing
directives to subordinate units or when drafting procedures and practices; aiding
local counterparts in the identification of needed management skills in the fields of
human resources, finances, logistics and training; or ensuring the establishment of a
positive line of communication and interdependency between managers and
supervisors within each police administration, to name just a few examples [8].
This co-location policy was accompanied, among other things, by specialised “train
the trainers” projects and visits to European countries to show Bosnian police
managers how police practices were developed in other European settings.
As mentioned earlier, the commitment to local ownership (understood not only as
local participation in the reform process but also as developing the local capacity
needed to attain operational sustainability) included financial sustainability of the
reforms introduced. A functional study carried out by a team of international and
local police experts with funding from the European Commission concluded that too
much public money was being spent on security compared with old and new EU
members [13]. This disproportionate allocation of money was taking place at the
expense of the health, social and education sectors. Moreover, of the allocated
money to policing, an average of 79% went in 2004 to operational processes
(salaries, allowances, etc.) starving the police agencies of the necessary resources to
equip and train themselves appropriately. Paradoxically, at the same time police
salaries remained too low due to the high number of officers in the ranks of the
police, despite the important reductions carried out during the UN phase.
This situation was deemed untenable for a number of reasons. Firstly, in previous
years ordinary crime and the security of citizens (including minorities) had no longer
been perceived by the international community as pressing problems.17 Thus, with
the exception of the resources devoted to combating organised crime, one could
wonder if there was a need for such a high share of public expenditures going to the
police.18 Secondly, the inadequate management of police budgets was having
15 Confidential interview, Sarajevo, 2006.
16 UN police officers had been more widely co-located, reaching all levels of the police structures, down
to police stations. For reasons of size and approach, this policy was regarded as unnecessary during the
EUPM period, something that was not shared by all analysts on the ground (Confidential interviews,
Sarajevo, 2003).
17 Confidential interviews, Sarajevo and via email, 2006.
18 The example of Doboj–known as a stronghold of extreme Serb nationalism during the war and the
immediate post-conflict phase-has been used by the European Stability Initiative as a clear illustration of
the much improved security situation in the country [15].
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negative effects for the efficiency of local police agencies to carry out their work and
consolidate the reforms introduced with the assistance of the international
community. This leads us to the third set of reasons to explain the untenable
situation, which is the fact that the ongoing dependence on external funding could
have very negative repercussions in terms of sustainability, unless the situation
changed, as that funding was meant to diminish as Bosnia became more capable of
operating on its own. On the last two points, the words of Maria Cristina Stepanescu,
at the time Head of the EUPM Programme Development and Coordination
Department, are very illuminating: “Most of the obstacles are of a financial nature
and can be overcome in two ways: further support from the donor community or better
planning of the budget from the BiH LEA [law enforcement agencies] managers” [9].
The European Commission-funded report proposed an internal reorganisation and
restructuring of Bosnian law enforcement agencies that would reduce personnel
costs while increasing productivity [13]. EUPM, particularly during its first mandate,
sought to introduce a sustainable “Western culture of financial management” [17]. Its
end goal was to develop independence, transparency and a cost-effective ethos by,
among other things, strengthening management and control of revenue collections
and use of resources, harmonising country-wide salary provisions and greater
supervision over Bosnian police authorities’ responsibility to further downsize police
personnel.
EUPM: applying “European police standards/practices”
One of the most fundamental problems faced by the EU in Bosnia was applying the
concept of “European police standards/practices”, which to date remains unsolved
due to the non-existence of a common definition at the operational level.19 The
Council of Europe’s guidelines are a good starting point as are the institutional
mechanisms in place to standardise police education in Europe [19]. However, these
have so far not been translated into formulas that can redress the multitude of
operational “mismatches” that happen on the ground, at least in so far as the case of
Bosnia goes. These mismatches have tended to limit the effectiveness and legitimacy
of EUPM efforts, particularly when those standards or practices were not even met by
its personnel or mandate. Take the example of the 10% European female rate among
police services that should be reached in Bosnia against the under-representation of
female police officers within EUPM personnel, or the questionable Europeanness of
community policing practices, as exemplified by the debate raging in France between
right and left over policing in the banlieues [23, 10, 4].20 The goal of centralising the
Bosnian police system is undermined by insistence on “European police standards/
practices” that remain difficult to specify.
Although the police restructuring process was not originally linked to EU
membership, they have gradually become closely related.21 Lord Paddy Ashdown,
19 Confidential interviews, Sarajevo and Brussels, 2002-2007.
20 Confidential interviews, various locations in Bosnia and Brussels, 2002-2007.
21 Confidential interview, Sarajevo, 2006.
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then High Representative, created the Police Restructuring Commission in July 2004
to elaborate proposals for a single police structure under the political oversight of a
ministry or ministries in the Council of Ministers of BiH [21]. Chaired by former
Prime Minister of Belgium Wilfred Martens, the Commission was composed of
Bosnian political, civil and police representatives from all the main communities, the
EUPM Commissioner and international observers. After months of meetings, the
report issued in December 2004 (known as the “Martens report”) advocated
centralisation and rationalisation in order to ensure better, non-politicised use of
existing resources and to improve relations between police agencies within the
Federation of Bosnia but also with Republika Srpska.
The most controversial aspect of the Martens report was its recommendation to
reorganise Bosnian law enforcement agencies into a smaller number of Police Areas
that would cross the Inter-Entity Border Line. Some local stakeholders —mainly
Republika Srpska—feared that it would ultimately entail a further erosion of the
Entities (and ultimately their disappearance) by transferring even more competences
to the State level. The final report did not prescribe any specific model, because the
Police Restructuring Commission found it impossible to agree upon one. Thus,
Paddy Ashdown—who favoured centralisation—was presented with various alter-
natives. Republika Srpska did not accept the final report leading to more political
negotiations. Agreement finally came in October 2005, but only as far as the three
basic European Commission principles that had underpinned the process from the
beginning: (1) legislative and budgetary competencies for all Bosnian police matters
must be at the State level; (2) no political interference in any operational police
matter; and (3) the establishment of local police areas according to purely
professional technical criteria. These principles were to be applied in accordance
with BiH and Entity constitutions. The October 2005 agreement was therefore an
agreement to have further discussions on the topic.
The October 2005 agreement led to the creation of a Directorate for Police Re-
structuring Implementation (DPRI) that included as members all the police agencies
in BiH. Mandated to agree on a common plan for implementation of police
restructuring, it took the DPRI until December 2006 to come up with some proposals
of a very similar nature to the Martens report. Events in 2007 brought the process to
another stalemate as the DPRI plan would not receive governmental and
parliamentary endorsement, partly a casualty of the heightened nationalist rhetoric
used by political candidates to the October 2006 elections, and the wider context of
the 2007 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on whether genocide had taken
place in Srebrenica.22 The complex political situation lead to Bosnia missing the
22 The Court ruled that genocide had taken place in the 1995 massacres of Bosniaks in Srebrenica but
Serbia could not be found guilty of that even if it provided military and financial aid to the Republika
Srpska (RS) army and police. The Court could only find Serbia guilty of failing to stop genocide but even
then, Bosnia could not demand reparations from this country. Haris Silajdžić, member of the Presidency of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, called for the abolition of the RS based on the ICJ finding that genocide has
indeed taken place in Srebrenica and a Bosniak initiative has sought to remove Srebrenica from RS
jurisdiction. Meanwhile, Milorad Dodik, RS Prime Minister, has refused to accept that the RS is guilty of
genocide and has pushed for a federal solution to the current Bosnian map. The relationship between these
two leaders has tainted the police restructuring process which, as initially shaped by the Martens
Commission, would have led to decisive political and constitutional changes.
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September 2007 deadline to begin a Stabilisation and Association Agreement,
plunging the country into one of its worst political crisis. Although a solution was
found by December 2007, much has depended on the EU making important
compromises on police restructuring and in so doing, raising questions about the
EU’s capacity to lure all Bosnian stakeholders when it comes at the expenses of
territorial politics. For some critics the end result has been a minimal restructuring
process compared with the original Martens plan, leaving untouched the main
contentious issues.
At a technical level, centralisation of some functions does make sense, because by
the time the police restructuring process began there was still an unnecessary
overspecialisation at field level—responding often to ethnic politics. This led to
duplication, delays and waste of resources, and inefficiency in the police fight
against serious and organised crime, war crimes and corruption.23 EUPM has sought
to make progress by avoiding the politics of such a statebuilding agenda, instead
“integrating from below”, through technical reforms [24].24 Thus EUPM took a
strategic role in the internationally-driven attempt to de-link policing from past and
lingering conflicts.
However, an overwhelming majority of commentators have argued that EUPM’s
technical reforms were hijacked by former High Representative Paddy Ashdown
from the very beginning of the police restructuring process, and endorsed by the EU
(albeit with initial great doubts by the European Commission)—pressing for a
remaking of Bosnia in a certain political image, rather than being motivated by the
need to improve police cost-effectiveness. This political push for a certain model of
statehood (centralisation) was not shared by all local stakeholders, indeed it seemed
to undermine Republika Srpska [15, 18]. In the words of Tihomir Loza, writing for
Transitions Online, “it was never true that the only police structure compatible with
Europe would be one that bears no relation to any other institutional network in the
country” [16]. More importantly, it has also politicised European police standards by
presenting centralisation as a required condition for EU membership when the reality
is far from that. In fact, the 2004 European Commission-funded functional review of
the police in Bosnia argued that what was needed was organisational change to
strengthen crime-fighting abilities and state-level institutions, not a new territorial
organisation of the police. The report specifically mentioned that having 15 law
enforcement agencies could not be considered a “a weakness per se”, taking into account
the 25 autonomous police regions and one central unit existing in TheNetherlands or the
26 cantonal police agencies and one federal unit in the Swiss system [13]. Thus, a
number of organisational options that met European best practices were available to
Bosnia: (1) a top-down approach based on a national police; (2) a system like the
current one but without cantonal police units (that is, with police at state and Entity
and Brčko level only); or (3) a bottom up approach based on police at the municipal
23 Confidential interviews, Travnik and Sarajevo, 2003.
24 Examples of such reforms include EUPM’s work in strengthening state-level institutions (the State
Border Service and the State Investigation and Protection Agency); harmonising throughout the country
standards and procedures relating to police academy curricula, promotion and selection, accountability,
etc. to minimise political intrusion in police matters; and the introduction of information databases/
networks to be shared among all police agencies in the country.
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and national level. The choice of organisational structure should depend on technical
police parameters and could only be decided by local stakeholders as local ownership
was of prime importance to the sustainability of the process [13]. In other words, the
conclusions of this functional review provided a completely different picture to that
progressively pushed forward by Ashdown’s police restructuring process.
This politicisation of the idea of “European standards practices” has to a certain
extent been detrimental for the legitimacy of other measures being introduced by the
EUPM. In fact, the predominant role adopted by the police restructuring process
since 2004 led to the interruption or slowing down of programmes/projects under
EUPM’s first mandate. This slowing down was partly due to their dependence on the
passing of legislation that was not taking place (due to the political impasse). The
slowing down of progress was also partly due to the high priority given to the police
restructuring process, reducing the political energy and resources available for crime-
fighting.25 Some analysts and members of the international presence on the ground
have argued that EUPM—supposed to be the lead agency for all police matters in
Bosnia—should have had more leadership from the very beginning of the police
restructuring process, thus avoiding the subordination of its work to other actors,
namely the OHR. This situation is blamed by some on former EUPM Commissioner
Kevin Carty’s overly conservative interpretation of the mandate that, at the time
(2003–2005), did not include a direct reference to police restructuring.26 Indeed,
although institutional and capacity building was one of the original goals of EUPM,
police restructuring was not explicitly mentioned until three years into the Mission’s
presence in Bosnia. For some issues, such as financial sustainability, greater
restructuring powers in the hands of EUPM might have helped. Furthermore, EUPM
was actively involved in providing technical advice throughout the police
restructuring process. However, whether a greater EUPM involvement in this
process would have been positive, given the politicised course of events, is a matter
for debate. What is certain is that it would have tarnished one of the most important
police precepts that the international community has tried to introduce in Bosnia: de-
politicisation of police matters.27
Concluding remarks
The EUPM has tried to push forward, through a number of technical changes, the
standardisation and harmonisation of the fragmented Bosnian police. The aim has
been to make the system more effective at combating organised crime and corruption,
to tackle the politicisation of the police that had developed during the conflict period of
the 1990s, and to develop a more ‘human’ face towards Bosnian citizens. These
reforms have somewhat de-territorialised some police functions, by pushing them up
to the state-level, through the strengthening of the State Border Service and State
25 Confidential interviews, Sarajevo, 2006.
26 Confidential interviews, Sarajevo, 2006.
27 EUPM has been characterised–at least for a long time–for having a strong police identity that has at
times worked against the role of civilians within the Mission.
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Investigation and Protection Agency. Notwithstanding EUPM’s achievements, a
combination of internal and external factors have limited its contribution to Bosnia’s
recovery. Some of the resulting problems—such as a particular and politically partial
interpretation of the generally slippery concept of “European police standards/
practices”—appear to have been created by the international partners. Thus EUPM,
like its Bosnia counterparts, reacts to a situation not of its making. The police
restructuring process is regarded by some as constitutional reform by other means,
where politics has often mattered more than the needs of Bosnians. Such a situation
has worked against the building of local ownership in the country, as the police
restructuring process has been despite words to the contrary, completely foreign-driven.
It has also shed a negative light over the concept of “European best police standards/
practices”, making Bosnia a clear example of what Clifford Shearing calls the “lack of
synchronisation between patterns of policing in established democracies and the
international policing assistance programmes they pursue” (1994, cited in [1]).
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